Chapter 10: Second Bombardment of Attu
26 April
1943
During March our air operations had been stepped up to an
extent which permitted 39 raids to be made on Kiska during the month. In early
April, however, a spell of stormy weather with winds up to 108 m.p.h. grounded
all planes for five days. Nevertheless, by the 21st Kiska had been attacked 83
times, and by the end of the month 640 tons of bombs had been dropped.
Meanwhile strong reinforcements for the North Pacific Force
began to reach the area in preparation for the eventual assault on Attu. These
included two battleships, four cruisers, and many destroyers. Admiral McMorris'
striking group had lost the services of the
Salt Lake City,
Bailey,
Dale, and
Monaghan,
but had been strengthened by the assignment of the
Santa Fe (Capt. Russel S. Berkey),
Detroit (Capt. Ellis H. Beiselman),
Bancroft (Comdr. John L. Melgaard),
Caldwell (Lt. Comdr. Horatio A Lincoln),
Edwards (Lt. Comdr. Paul G. Osler),
Frazier (Lt. Comdr. Frank Virden), and
Gansevoort (Comdr. Edward A. McFall). During April it operated westward
and northwestward of Attu, to prevent supplies and reinforcements reaching the
western islands. The last ship known to have reached Attu was the Kankyo Maru
(3,200 tons) which arrived and departed on 25 March. It is believed that after
the Battle of the Komandorskis no enemy ships, except submarines, ran the
blockade, but there was the continuing threat that the attempt would be made.
Task Group Mike was conducting its usual patrol on the
afternoon of 25 April when it received a dispatch from Admiral Kinkaid directing
the bombardment of Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor shortly after daylight the
next day. Preparations were immediately made and targets assigned to individual
ships. Course was laid for Holtz Bay and a speed of 20 knots set to arrive off
its entrance soon after daybreak.
About 0530 Attu was sighted to the southeastward.
Visibility was poor, with fog patches and snow squalls in many directions. An
hour later the weather was still unpromising. Wind and sea had picked up so much
that the contemplated launching of aircraft was canceled, since recovery would
have been most hazardous. At this time heading was changed to 130º T., the
bombardment course, which was maintained thereafter except
page 77
for a six-minute interval when the group shifted course to
close the coastline.
The weather began to clear slightly at 0800. Fifteen
minutes later signal to commence firing was executed. The order of ships was
Caldwell, Bancroft, Coghlan, Richmond, Santa Fe,
Detroit, Frazier, Gansevoort, and Edwards. To avoid
interfering with each other's fire, ships were, for the most part, to fire in
succession, though not necessarily in accordance with their positions in the
column.
The Caldwell began the action. The Santa Fe
then joined in, and after several minutes a mass of black, smoke was observed in
the east arm of Holtz Bay, near the airfield. At 0830 a small fog patch drifted
across the harbor entrance and prevented firing for a short interval. When the
guns resumed, various conflagrations and explosions were noted, but none of any
great importance. By 0840 signal was made to cease firing, since allotted
ammunition had been expended, and the headlands were closing off all targets. At
the end of the bombardment, air coverage was instituted by a B-24 and later by a
patrol plane.
Better results might have been achieved, in the opinion of
Admiral McMorris, if it had been possible to use spotting planes. But the task
group commander feared that the harbors would soon be completely closed down by
the fog and felt that he should make use of present opportunities. As it was,
except for the lack of spotting aircraft, "conditions proved to be excellent."
The task group commander believed that the bombardment had been much more
effective than the previous one of 18 February. Fire control was generally
satisfactory.
No major installations or shipping were observed. There
were no signs of personnel or activity ashore. A number of small buildings and
huts, however, testified to the presence of the enemy, even if he did not choose
to give away the positions of his artillery by firing on the task group. In
April the task group was familiar with the area and was augmented by the
Santa Fe, a most effective bombardment ships. Photographs taken nine or ten
days after the action showed many craters in regions where building activity had
been noted by prior reconnaissance, as well as in the vicinity of the incomplete
airfield. In view of later experience, however, it seems unlikely that a
restricted bombardment of this type could have caused more than transitory
inconvenience to the enemy.
page 78
By the end of April, Adak, the center of operations in the
Aleutians area, was maintaining a garrison of 19.067 Army personnel and 7,811
Navy. At Amchitka, where there were 10,260 Army and 903 Navy personnel, a
5,000-foot bomber strip had been completed during the month. The new fields on
Amchitka enabled our air power at last to assume significant proportions. Many
buildings in the Main Camp area on Kiska, as well as part of the submarine base,
had been destroyed. But despite the 1,000 sorties made by our planes during
April, new construction on Kiska and Attu rapidly replaced damaged structures.
In May we made 35 strikes in 22 days, 17 against Kiska, 17
against Attu, and one directed at the Rat Islands. Our air forces dropped 470
tons of bombs on the two major islands with a loss of 28 planes, only three of
which were known to have been destroyed by enemy action. But in this month air
activity was suddenly eclipsed by the long-hoped-for, long-planned invasion of
Attu.
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